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Looking	beyond	5G:	Why	Europe	is	far	from	naïve
when	it	comes	to	issues	of	strategic	dependence
The	United	States	has	advised	countries	in	Europe	to	avoid	using	technology	provided	by	the	Chinese
company	Huawei	in	their	5G	networks.	Yet	so	far,	these	warnings	have	had	a	relatively	limited	impact
on	European	governments.	Vasileios	Theodosopoulos	argues	that	despite	disagreements	over	5G,
the	United	States	should	not	overlook	the	EU’s	efforts	elsewhere	to	develop	supply	chain	security	and
safeguard	critical	resources	and	technologies.
Over	the	past	two	years,	Washington	has	exerted	considerable	effort	to	get	its	European	allies	to	exclude	Chinese
telecommunications	giant	Huawei	from	the	continent’s	5G	infrastructure.	The	US	government’s	chief	concern	is	that
relying	on	the	company’s	equipment	poses	considerable	security	risks	and	might	jeopardise	the	transatlantic
relationship.	Of	course,	5G	exemplifies	a	broader	US	concern:	namely,	that	Chinese	companies	might	come	to
dominate	key	global	value	chains	and	infrastructure,	creating	dependences	and	security	vulnerabilities	that	Beijing
could	then	leverage	to	its	geopolitical	advantage.
While	Europe’s	response	to	5G	has	attracted	the	most	attention	across	the	Atlantic,	it	should	not	be	seen	as	the
only	measure	of	the	European	approach	to	supply	chain	security	or	the	safeguarding	of	critical	resources	and
technologies.	In	fact,	there	are	other	domains	beyond	5G	in	which	Chinese	dominance	poses	equal,	if	not	greater,
risks	and	where	Brussels	is	already	working	on	reducing	its	dependence	and	enhancing	its	strategic	autonomy.
Washington	should	not	overlook	the	Union’s	efforts	here,	especially	as	all	digital	technologies	rely	on	critical
materials,	as	the	EU’s	new	industrial	strategy	also	recognises.
Under	the	digital	hood
While	they	might	lack	the	techno-futuristic	appeal	of	5G	or	AI,	critical	raw	materials	are	vital	for	the	security	and
prosperity	of	our	21st	century	societies.	Underpinning	all	innovative	digital	technologies	are	material	components
such	as	hard-drives,	semiconductors	and	batteries,	in	the	production	of	which	critical	materials	are	irreplaceable.
They	are	also	essential	for	‘green’	technologies,	such	as	solar	panels,	wind	turbines	and	electric	batteries,	as	well
as	for	manufacturing	state-of-the-art	aerospace	and	defence	equipment	(e.g.	super-alloys,	laser	technology,
ammunition).	In	short,	many	sensitive	technologies,	including	5G,	would	be	nothing	without	critical	materials.
For	access	to	these	materials,	global	supply	chains	largely	rely	on	a	handful	of	countries.	China,	in	particular,
enjoys	overwhelming	dominance	in	the	production	and	processing	stages	of	critical	raw	material	value	chains	and
Beijing	is	the	leading	supplier	for	both	the	EU	and	the	US.	Coupled	with	the	ever-growing	global	demand	for	critical
materials	and	the	increasing	geopoliticisation	of	international	trade,	this	dependence	creates	serious	security	of
supply	challenges	for	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	Beijing’s	past	threats	to	cut	off	the	US’	supply	of	rare	earths	may
have	been	a	preview	of	what	the	future	holds.
The	EU	as	a	geopolitical	player
The	EU	has	not	remained	idle	in	the	face	of	this	growing	geopolitical	risk.	Under	the	framework	of	its	2008	Raw
Materials	Initiative,	the	Union	has	followed	a	three-pronged	approach	to	strategic	materials.	First,	Europe	has
secured	its	supply	of	raw	materials	from	abroad	through	partnerships	and	policy	dialogues	with	key	material
producers	and	other	major	importers,	including	the	US.	The	Union	has	also	utilised	the	WTO	framework	to	undo
Chinese	protectionist	measures	when	it	comes	to	critical	materials,	including	rare	earth	elements.	Europeans	have
begun	more	actively	pursuing	supplier	diversification	as	well.	For	instance,	last	summer	a	European	firm	replaced	a
Chinese	company	as	the	key	investor	in	an	Australian	rare	earths	plant,	securing	the	rights	to	its	entire	output.
Under	its	new	Africa	Strategy,	the	EU	also	plans	to	deepen	its	cooperation	with	African	raw	materials	producers.
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Second,	with	a	view	to	boosting	its	domestic	production	capacity,	Brussels	has	launched	a	number	of	initiatives
focused	on	mapping	the	continent’s	own	resources	and	building	up	relevant	expertise.	In	recent	years,	exploration
activities	in	Europe	have	also	increased,	with	major	projects	in	Greenland	and	Sweden	reaching	advanced	stages
of	exploration	and	development.	Another	example	of	Europeans’	determination	to	decrease	their	import-
dependence	is	the	European	Battery	Alliance	initiative,	which	aims	to	build	an	integrated	value	chain	for	lithium-ion
electric	car	batteries.
Finally,	Europe	has	also	invested	considerable	effort	and	resources	into	improving	its	resource	use	efficiency,
enhancing	its	supply	of	secondary	raw	materials	and	developing	alternatives	for	critical	raw	materials.	In	the	past
few	years,	the	EU	research	and	innovation	framework	programme	has	provided	around	450	million	euros’	worth	of
funding	to	raw-material	related	projects,	and	efforts	along	these	lines	are	expected	to	continue	under	the	Union’s
next	budgetary	cycle.
Taking	the	EU’s	efforts	further
Of	course,	the	EU	approach	to	critical	raw	material	security	is	not	without	its	weaknesses.	To	start	with,	its
overarching	policy	and	strategy	framework,	last	revised	in	2011,	does	not	fully	reflect	today’s	geopolitical	context.
The	Union	has	also	not	focused	enough	on	building	capacity	in	and	around	Europe,	while	its	supply	diversification
efforts	are	still	in	their	infancy.	As	it	seeks	to	develop	a	new	action	plan	to	remedy	these	deficiencies,	Europe
should	look	at	what	the	US	has	been	doing	in	this	area	since	the	release	of	its	2019	“Federal	Strategy	to	Ensure	a
Reliable	Supply	of	Critical	Minerals”.
Through	the	strategy,	Washington	seeks	to	reduce	the	‘strategic	vulnerability’	caused	by	its	dependence	on	critical
minerals	imports.	Abroad,	it	has	started	developing	alternative	import	options	through	strategic	partnerships	with
major	producers,	such	as	the	multilateral	Energy	Resource	Governance	Initiative	platform	and	bilateral	partnerships
with	Australia,	Canada	and	Greenland.	Meanwhile,	the	government	seeks	to	rebuild	domestic	value	chains	by
encouraging	recent	industry	initiatives	in	this	field.	Notably,	the	US	Army	intends	to	finance	domestic	rare	earth
element	production,	while	legislation	introduced	in	the	Senate	would	allow	producers	to	form	a	cooperative	and
create	a	fully	integrated	domestic	rare	earth	value	chain.
Europe	should	examine	the	American	approach	closely.	Although	the	political,	legal,	economic	and	technological-
industrial	circumstances	on	the	two	sides	of	the	Atlantic	differ,	European	strategists	and	policymakers	may	still	gain
valuable	insights	from	studying	the	US	strategy,	which	could	potentially	be	adapted	to	European	realities.	However,
it	could	be	in	the	interests	of	both	the	US	and	the	EU	to	compare	strategies,	as	there	is	substantial	overlap	between
their	respective	threat	perceptions	and	objectives.
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A	strategic	partnership	for	raw	materials?
Indeed,	given	the	importance	of	critical	raw	material	supplies	working	together	on	areas	like	resource	mapping,
research	and	development,	and	investment	is	essential.	Joining	forces	could	allow	Brussels	and	Washington	to
coordinate	their	policies	and	resource	allocation,	avoiding	a	duplication	of	efforts.	But	the	two	partners	could	go
further	than	this.
For	example,	the	existing	EU-US-Japan	trilateral	conference	on	critical	materials	could	be	extended	to	include	like-
minded	countries	like	Australia	and	Canada,	which	share	the	concerns	about	the	concentration	of	critical	global
value	chains	and	technologies	under	authoritarian	control.	Between	them,	these	advanced	market	democracies,
which	include	both	critical	resource	material	producers	and	consumers,	possess	the	market	depth	and	the	financial
and	technological-industrial	wherewithal	to	reshape	the	global	critical	material	supply	architecture	and	increase	their
collective	strategic	autonomy.
The	issue	of	raw	materials	security	of	supply	shows	that	the	transatlantic	agenda	on	strategic	dependence	should
not	be	limited	to	5G;	recent	tensions	notwithstanding,	shared	values	and	interests	ensure	ample	scope	for	EU-US
cooperation.	Furthermore,	it	demonstrates	that	Europe’s	ambition	for	strategic	autonomy	should	not	be	interpreted
as	a	desire	to	weaken	the	transatlantic	relationship.	Rather,	it	is	an	effort	to	make	Europe	more	capable	and
independent,	and	thus	more	valuable	as	an	ally,	which	will	often	entail	working	with	Washington	and	contributing	to
US	strategic	autonomy	too.	As	such,	embracing	Europe’s	plans	to	reduce	its	critical	resource	dependences	is	in
Washington’s	best	interest	–	even	more	so	in	view	of	its	growing	geopolitical	competition	with	China.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author	and	does	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	EUISS,	the
European	Union,	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	The	author	would
like	to	thank	Daniel	Fiott	for	his	invaluable	input	to	the	article.
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